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Abstract 
This paper examines the changes in regional and sectoral inequality that accompanied economic 
transformation in Russia and China throughout the 1990s. The experiences of the two countries are 
widely viewed as having been polar opposites.  While the Soviet collapse had adverse consequences for 
many parts of the post-Soviet population, the Chinese experience produced a continuing rise of average 
living standards. Nevertheless, both countries experienced a drastic increase in economic inequality.  In 
both cases, regional inequalities rose more sharply than inequalities across sectors but within regions. In 
particular, major urban centers gained dramatically relative to the hinterlands.  Also, in Russia as in China, 
those sectors exercising the largest degrees of monopoly power gained the most (or lost the least) in 
relative terms.  In both countries, the respective position of finance improved greatly, while that of 
agriculture declined.  The decline of agriculture in China, however, was not as precipitous as in Russia, 
and certain sectors, such as education and science, maintained their position in China in a way that was 
not possible for them in Russia. 
JEL Classification: P52, P27, D39, C82 
Keywords: Inequality, Russia, China, Provinces, Sectors 
1.  Introduction 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the acceleration of economic reforms in 
the People’s Republic of China were landmark events of the 1990s. Generally they are a 
study in contrasts.   Economic liberalization produced chaos, hyperinflation, industrial 
collapse, and privation in post-Soviet Russia, whereas the Chinese experienced sustained 
economic growth and continuing, visible improvement in living standards.   On the 
political front, Russia acquired the trappings of parliamentary democracy, with an 
independent commercial press.  Meanwhile China continued under one-party rule 
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guided by the Chinese Communist Party, and an independent media has not been 
permitted to exist.  
It is well-known from studies such as Sheviakov and Kiruta (2001) that 
economic  inequality rose drastically in Russia during the transition.  The regional 
dimension of this increase figures prominently in the papers so far published, including 
Mikheeva (1999) and Bradshaw and Vartapetov (2003), who calculate regional 
dispersions for the periods 1990-1996 and 1990-2001, respectively.  Federov (2002, p. 
443), however, argues that inequality increases between Russian regions “leveled off and 
even reversed in the late 1990s.”  Kislitsyna (2003) attempts a general explanation of the 
rise in income inequality using data from the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(for even-numbered years from 1992-2000), and also provides a useful comparison to 
the inequality of expenditures. Her work is however limited to a study of household 
characteristics, such as age, education, and household composition; from among these 
variables she identifies earnings status as a key to the rise in Russian income inequality.   
For China, Khan et al. (1999) report a 42.5 percent increase in a Gini measure of 
household income inequality in China between 1988 and 1995 alone; Gustaffson and Li 
(2001) decompose this change to show the role of money income in rural China and of 
housing and pension benefits in urban areas, while Yang (1999) argued from data on 
two provinces that “widening sectoral gaps in recent years have caused the rising 
inequality in China.”  Meanwhile, in a contrarian but narrow paper, Wei and Wu (2001) 
argue that urban-rural inequality between cities and adjacent countryside declined in 
areas experiencing greater exposure to international trade.  Benjamin et al. (2004) 
document rising rural inequality from 1987 through 1999 with data from nine provinces, 
finding an accelerating increase in inequality since 1995, while Wu and Perloff (2004) 
estimate the shapes of whole distributions (rural, urban and the rural/urban gap) from 
interval statistics in the national household survey.  
Overall, the information provided by sample surveys on this topic tends to be of 
a very general kind, and there are limitations of data. For Russia no study assesses the 
joint effect of regional and sectoral income changes, while for China, as Benjamin et al. 
(2004, 7)  note, with one exception “there are no studies that track inequality...on 
anything approximating a continuous basis.” And equally there are limitations of 
method. As Wu and Perloff state (2004, 1)  “...the Gini index only reflects some aspects 
of the underlying income distribution. A large amount of information is lost.”  One 
generally learns less from these sources than one would like to know about the specific 
geographic and sectoral patterns of distributional change, and about the precise 
moments when changes accelerated or slowed down. 
This paper takes a new look at the Chinese and Russian transitions, drawing on 
official sources such as the labor data of the State Committee of the Russian Federation 
on Statistics (hereafter, Goskomstat) and the Chinese State Statistical Bureau.  From 
these sources we calculate our own measurement of economic inequality, a key concern 
especially in countries with a history of communism, and a driving force in the social 
development of any country.  In particular, we examine the pattern of relative gains and 
losses in two dimensions: regions and sectors.  That is, we look at the changing spatial 
distribution of economic activity in both countries, and in the relative prosperity and 
impoverishment of different branches of activity, as classified and measured by official 
sources. 
We find that there are major similarities between the economic experiences of 
Russia and China in the 1990s, when looked at in this way.  In both countries, inequality  
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rose as economic liberalization proceeded.   In both, regional inequalities rose 
dramatically, creating major new divisions across geographic space.  In both cases, 
certain sectors gained in relative position, notably those that were apparently able to 
exploit new-found market power to create and retain economic rents.  Of these, finance, 
utilities and transportation were the most important in China, and finance and energy 
production (counted as part of industrial production in the official statistics) were 
dominant in Russia.  However, China’s advantage shows up in two important respects. 
First, unlike in Russia, the region with the greatest gains is a major population center. 
And second, incomes in education and the social sectors have held up far better than in 
the Russian federation, a fact that surely reflects differences in the fiscal capacities of the 
two states. 
The next section describes methods and data. Sections three and four describe 
the economic experiences of Russia and China, respectively.  Section five presents brief 
conclusions. 
2.  Methods and Data 
 
Previous work on inequality in both Russia and China relies mainly on sample 
surveys, which have been conducted in both countries on a regular basis. And surveys 
show what we also will find: rising economic inequality has been a signal characteristic 
of both countries in the time of liberalization.  What we present here is not novel in that 
respect. 
Nevertheless, the survey approach to the study of inequality suffers from 
disadvantages.  In the Russian case, Sheviakov and Kiruta (2001) raised questions about 
discrepancies between survey-based and macroeconomic measures of income and 
consumption. They indicate that the rise in inequality captured in survey measures may 
be overstated.  In China, we are able to find broad measures of urban and rural income 
inequality up through 2001 , as is reported in Riskin et al. 2001 and updated in Wu and 
Perloff, 2004).  But the level of detail is not high; measures are reported for urban areas, 
rural areas and the gap between them, leaving many questions on the cutting room 
floor. 
Our approach relies not on surveys, but on the regularly gathered official 
measures of income by region and sector.  In Russia, this information is collected and 
published by Goskomstat,  mainly in annual hard copy publications.  Russian data take 
the form of payroll and employment figures for fourteen major economic sectors, in 
each of 89 distinct geographic entities (city, republic, oblast, okrug, krai).  There are 
1232 province-sector cells in our data set for Russia, for each of eleven years from 1990 
through 2000, inclusive. 
In China, data at a sufficient level of detail are published annually in the China 
Statistical Yearbook, and are available in electronic format. For the year 2000 we have 
data for each of 16 sectors for 30 provinces in China, or 480 sector-province cells. The 
Chinese data experienced some changes in category structure over the years, which 
affects the continuity of our measures. The data extend back to 1987 on a reasonably 
consistent annual basis, and it is possible to extend the analysis as far back as 1979 with 
more highly aggregated information. 
Our method is to compute the between-groups component of Theil’s T statistic 
across province-sector cells for both Russia and China.   Theil’s T is a very simple 
measure of inequality, relying only on two bits of information about each cell: its weight  
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in total population (or employment), and the ratio of average income within the cell to 
average income in the country as a whole. The mathematical properties of Theil’s T 
have been explored in detail elsewhere, and we need not repeat that discussion here 
(Conceição and Galbraith 2000, Conceição Galbraith and Bradford 2001). Theil’s T has 
properties that make it attractive for this type of calculation; in particular it is possible to 
sum row and column elements so as to arrive at cross-sector and cross-province 
measures of inequality.  It is also possible to look directly at the contribution to overall 
inequality of each cell, sector or province, and to gauge the change in that contribution 
from year to year.  We do not claim for these data more than one should: they are an 
incomplete record of the changing patterns of income dispersion.  They nevertheless 
contain a wealth of information that deserves to be explored. In particular, they provide 
a very convenient way to visualize the winners and losers in the process of economic 
change. 
3.  The Case of Russia 
 
The post Soviet economic implosion stemmed from several main sources: 
decentralization and the physical breakup of the country, a complete collapse in 
investment (much of it unproductive, to be sure, but a provider of jobs and income 
nevertheless), and the cataclysmic effect of lower trade barriers on consumers’ 
willingness to continue to purchase home-made goods.  Industrial production fell by 
nearly half.  Meanwhile hyper-inflation devalued the savings of the Russian public, 
leaving many destitute, and both the government and enterprises sharply reduced social 
services of all kinds. The adverse consequences for many parts of the post-Soviet 
population included rising mortality rates, especially among older men, attributed in part 
to the stresses surrounding economic dislocation, in part to material impoverishment, 
and in part to the decline in the provision of health care in post Soviet Russia.  
These misfortunes occurred even as the country underwent political transition.  
The transition was not smooth: born in the collapse of a coup d’état, it involved the 
bloody suppression of parliament in 1993.  A riot of independent press in the early 
1990s became consolidated, after a fairly short time, under the substantial control of a 
small number of media oligarchs.  The transition from Yeltsin to Putin was a stage-
managed event, elevating a figure with no previous political standing. And the country 
has suffered an ongoing war in Chechnya, with catastrophic effects on the people of 
that region. Yet, despite recent attempts by Putin to “manage democracy” and reign in 
the media, the Russian population today lives under a multi-party system, with political 
liberties never before available to it. 
The Russian transition was marked by two years of profound crisis: the 
industrial collapse and hyper-inflation of 1992 and the financial collapse of 1998.     
Measures of inequality reveal the impact of these crises, particularly that of 1992.  When 
measured across 1232 province-sector cells, inequality in Russia doubled between 1991 
and 1992. After that inequality stabilized, for six years. But from 1998 to 1999 inequality 
rose another 39 percent, and it continued to rise into the year 2000.  Table 1 gives the 
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Table 1.  A Theil measure of Inequality for Russia, 1990-2001 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
0.031 0.035 0.070 0.059 0.071 0.076 0.068 0.065 0.068 0.095 0.102
 
Theil’s T statistic measured across 1232 province-sector cells in the Russian Federation. Source data: Goskomstat 
 
Figure 1 decomposes this measure of inequality into its two principal dimensions, 
namely sectoral and geographic, using data reported by Goskomstat at the sector and 
province levels.  
 









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Regional Sectoral
Inequality Trends in Russia, 1990-2000
 
 
Source: Goskomstat and authors’ calculations. 
 
As Figure 1 reveals, inequality increased across both dimensions, and especially 
during the critical transition crisis of 1991-1992.  Moreover, inequality across regions 
increased by considerably larger values than did inequality across sectors.  This suggests 
a strong geographic element to rising stratification in Russia: choice of place mattered 
more than choice of occupation or industry.  We shall, nevertheless, see shortly that 
economic fate of places in Russia had a great deal to do with  the spatial distribution of 
economic sectors.  
An implication of the finding that geography predominates in rising Russian 
inequality concerns the welfare implications of rising inequality itself.  Because cost-of-
living is a regional variable – housing, energy and food costs are place-specific – a 
changing pattern of relative incomes across Russia was also accompanied to a 
considerable extent by co-respective changes in the relative cost of living.
2  For this 
reason, rising national measures of inequality should be treated with caution, as they will 
tend to overstate the rise in inequality of place-specific living standards.   
                                                 
2  Sheviakov and Kiruta (2001) provide a discussion.  
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This point should not be interpreted as intended to dismiss the importance of 
rising inequality in the Russian Federation.  It points rather to a need to analyze the 
political and social dimensions of the increase.  As money incomes diverge across 
places, the worsening terms of trade of the lagging regions will induce migration to the 
more favored. And those who remain where money incomes are lower lose, to some 
extent, the economic capacity to interact with the rest of their own country.  Thus 
regional disparities may tend to promote political regionalism, while violent conflict (as 
in the Caucasus) may be partly a product, and partly a cause of a declining relative 
economic position.  
Figure 2 provides evidence on the particular pattern of place-specific gains and 
losses in post Soviet Russia.   The figure provides a series of stacked bar graphs, one for 
each year, where each color block within a bar represents the “Theil element” or 
weighted contribution to overall inequality of each province, oblast, or krai in that year.  
Regions whose average income is above the national average contribute a positive value 
to overall inter-provincial inequality; those whose average income is below the national 
average contribute a negative value.    
As the figure makes clear, the rising inter-regional inequalities in Russia occur in 
two phases. The larger element is a general increase in dispersion in the transition crisis, 
whose specific character is difficult to make out from the graph.  As the 1990s wear on, 
however, this resolves into a pattern of very rapidly rising relative incomes in just three 
places, whose color blocks come to dominate the visual field on the right of the figure.  
These are the city of Moscow (Green), and the districts of Khanty-Mansy (Yellow) and 
Tiumen (Red).  The latter two are lightly populated West Siberian oil and gas regions, 
and in this way the figure tells very succinctly the main story of post Soviet distribution 
in Russia. 
 
Figure 2:   Inter-regional contributions to inequality in Russia 
 
Source: Goskomstat and authors’ calculations.  
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Figure 3 presents a similar picture for the main sectors of the Russian economy 
(where, unfortunately, energy production is subsumed in the larger sectoral category of 
industrial production, which it comes by the end of the 1990s to dominate.)     
Transportation also experiences a rising relative share, while the previously dominant 
sector of construction experiences a loss of standing.  There is a notable increase in the 
relative share of income in the financial sector, an average earner in Soviet times.   And 
there are major losses, especially in agriculture, but also in science, culture and the arts, 
and education, health and sports.  None of this is, of course, mysterious to any observer 
of the Russian scene. 
 
Figure 3.  Inter-sectoral contributions to inequality in Russia. 
 
 
Source: Goskomstat and authors’ calculations. 
 
Maps provide a useful way to visualize the spatial redistribution of wealth in 
Russia.  In the figures that follow, the regional Theil elements are arrayed in a color 
scheme. Regions are divided into ten groups, using natural breaks in the data to allocate 
regions to groups.  The highest values, representing high shares of total income, are 
shown in red, with a shading to yellow for the second and third groups.  Intermediate 
deciles are shown in green; their contribution to inequality is slight either because they 
have low population shares or incomes close to the national average.  Blues indicate 
those regions with below average incomes and significant population shares: they are the 
centers of relative poverty in modern Russia.  The color scheme is geared to the values 
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of inequality in the year 2000; thus the maps are designed to show the evolution of 
inter-regional inequality in Russia toward their values in 2000.
3   
Figure 4 thus presents the spatial pattern of inequalities in European Russia and 
West Siberia in 1990.   Overall inequality was much lower in this period than it later 
became; hence the map is almost entirely in shades of green.  Touches of yellow indicate 
the higher money incomes in the Far North (costs were higher there too, of course), and 
light blue shows the lower incomes of the Caucasus regions in the South.  But the 
pattern is not extreme either way. 
 
Figure 4.  The Regional Distribution of Income in European Russia and West Siberia, 1990. 
 
 






Figure 5 shows the developments as of 2000.  A pattern of regional cleavage has 
emerged, with a flood of wealth attributed to Moscow City (not shown) and the lightly 
populated oil regions of Tiumen and Khanty-Mansy.  Of equal significance is the stark 
relative decline of the Russian South, the scene of course of many conflicts including 
the Chechen war. 
 
                                                 
3  For presentation purposes, the Far East is not shown; unfortunately also, due to restrictions in the 
software, Moscow City is not seen independently on these maps. 
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Figure 5.  The Regional Distribution of Income in European Russia and West Siberia, 2000. 
 
 




As a final exercise in this vein, Figures 6 and 7 present regional and sectoral data 
together in a single graph.  The device is a stacked line graph.  Each of the 89 regions is 
represented by a line, whose value at each of fourteen points on the x-axis is given by 
the contribution to overall inequality in Russia of the sector represented at that point.  
The provinces are arrayed by the size of their total contribution to inequality (from 
bottom to top), and the values are cumulated, so that the height of the stack at any 
sector represents total contribution to inequality of that sector.  The sectors are arrayed 
along the x-axis in accordance with their total contribution to inequality, so that reading 
along the axis provides a guide to the relative wealth and poverty of different economic 
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Source: Goskomstat and authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 7.   Province and Sector Inequality in Russia, 2000 
 
 
Source: Goskomstat and authors’ calculations 
 
The figures illustrate three fundamental points.  First is the very great scale of 
increasing inequality in Russia over a decade’s time.   Second, there is the reorganization 
of sector ranks.  Most notably, whereas in 1990 agricultural incomes were in the middle 
Stacked Plot ( 88v*14c)
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of the Soviet income distribution, a decade later they were at the bottom. Meanwhile, 
the finance sector had moved up, surpassing science and management, with especially 
strong gains in Moscow and Saint Petersburg.    Third, the high relative incomes in 
construction and industrial production in modern Russia are due to extraordinary 
relative gains in just a handful of places; in many places in the country these activities are 
not high-income.  This is consistent with the view that the energy sub-sector has come 
to dominate prosperous industrial activity in today’s Russia.   
 
4.  The Case of China 
 
The Chinese transition to a “socialist market economy” began with the 
liquidation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1979 and the re-institution of 
the Household Responsibility System for Chinese agriculture.
4  There followed a period 
of rapid agricultural productivity growth, with consequent surplus population, which 
became absorbed in light industry (township and village enterprises).  In the early 1980s 
special economic zones began the process of opening China’s coastal cities to foreign 
investment and to inward capital flow, a process which also facilitated technology 
transfer to Chinese industry.   
China’s GDP per capita roughly quadrupled over twenty years of economic 
reform, and although growth rates were undoubtedly higher in the early and mid 1980s 
than in the somewhat turbulent 1990s, economic development and transformation were 
abundantly visible throughout the country.  Chinese growth was fueled by rising 
agricultural productivity in the first phase of reforms, and then by the development of 
light industry under the rubric of township and village enterprises, as well as heavy 
investment in housing and urban infrastructure.  The effects are apparent everywhere, 
though less so in the heavy-industrial Northeast (Manchuria) than in the export-oriented 
South.  Growth was financed largely by internal savings, which amounted to over 35 
percent of income in the middle 1990s, and it was also facilitated by a vast expansion of 
China’s external trade, known as the open-door policy, culminating in China’s admission 
to the WTO. 
The tremendous success of the Chinese reforms in the 1980s led to large 
increases in living standards throughout the country, and a very substantial reduction of 
absolute poverty.  Food deprivation virtually disappeared.  However, economic 
slowdown at the end of the decade produced inflation, particularly in food prices, which 
contributed to the discontent of urban populations. This factor played a role in building 
popular support for the political movement for democracy of 1989, which culminated in 
the bloody battles of June 4 in Beijing.  
China reacted to the political upheavals of the late 1980s very differently from 
the Soviet Union.  The confrontation at Tienanmen Square led to intervention by the 
military, followed by a wave of political repression.   Since the early 1990s, the 
repression eased for most of the Chinese population, although open dissent against the 
system is still met with harsh measures.  Formal political change has occurred mainly at 
the local level, and only within the framework of continuing rule by the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
                                                 
4  For a brief history, see Galbraith and Lu, 2000.  
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Following that profound political shock, Chinese economic reform continued 
but along revised lines.  Continuing decentralization devolved power from the center to 
the provinces; sectoral liberalization devolved power toward industries whose strategic 
position involved elements of monopoly power.  Meanwhile, the post-Tienanmen 
government particularly encouraged the municipal authorities of Shanghai (whence the 
top officials came) to pursue grand plans to restore that city to its position of financial 
preeminence in Asia, while the government also embarked on an extraordinary 
redevelopment of the capital city. 
All of the above developments have visible effects on the pattern of income 
distribution in the People’s Republic of China over the 1990s. 
Figure 8 presents an overall measure of income inequality in China, calculated 
across sector-province cells.  It is superimposed over two standard sample-based 
measures of income inequality in China, one urban and one rural, taken from Wu and 
Perloff (2004).   All measures show approximately similar patterns, with particularly 
sharp increases in the early-middle 1990s for urban and overall inequality.  A drawback 
of the sector-province measure is that there was a redefinition of sectors in 1994, 
possibly causing some overstatement of the rise in inequality in that year. For clarity of 
comparison with the household survey measures, we treat the 1994 transition here as a 
break in the series, although in the next figure we show the spike in our measure that 
occurred that year.  The extension of the measure through 2000 shows further steady 
increases, at about the same pace as measures of household income inequality for both 
urban and rural populations. 
5 
 
Figure 8.   Measures of Inequality in China, 1987-2000. 
 










































Source: Wu and Perloff (2004), China Statistical Yearbook and authors’ calculations. 
 
                                                 
5  There is also a gap in our measure for 1996, covered by interpolation. 
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Figure 9 presents a regional and sectoral decomposition of our measure of 
inequality, breaking the overall increase into a measure between sectors and a measure 
between provinces. The figure illustrates that, as in Russia, in China the spatial 
dimension of rising inequality dominates the sectoral dimension.  Similar considerations 
therefore apply.  On the one hand, differences in regional costs of living undoubtedly 
mean that real living standards have not diverged as much as money incomes.  On the 
other hand, a pronounced spatial pattern of income inequality sets up political 
decentralization and also powerful incentives for internal migration, with resulting 
pressures on housing and social services in the magnet areas. 
 


























Source: China Statistical Yearbook and authors’ calculations 
 
In this chart we include the spiked pattern of rising overall and sectoral 
inequality for 1994, which is due to a sharp increase in between-province inequality (and 
not to the redefinition of sector boundaries in the same year). The effect does not 
appear to be due to anomalous reporting for any single province.  Rather, relative 
incomes rose sharply in that year in several high wage provinces, including Guangdong, 
Beijing, Shanghai and Zhejiang.  The precise reasons for this development (and its 
transient character) remain unclear, though in Wu and Perloff’s measure a transient peak 
in overall urban inequality can also be observed.
6 
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The contribution of each province to Chinese inequality is illustrated in Figure 
10, using the same principles shown for Russia in Figure 2.   Provinces whose income is 
below (above) the national average contribute a negative (positive) quantity to the Theil 
index, based on distance below (above) the average income and population weight.   
 
Figure 10. Inter-provincial contributions to inequality in China, 1987-1999. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook and authors calculations. 
 
The picture that emerges from Figure 10 is of the dense concentration of high 
incomes in just three places: Guangdong Province, and the municipalities of Shanghai 
and Beijing.  The first case is explicable by the fact that Guangdong is the major center 
for rapidly growing export manufacturing in China.  Shanghai and Beijing enjoyed 
particularly free rein in this period to pursue rapid economic development and 
redevelopment, as any visitor to either city can attest.  What is striking is the extent to  
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which these cases appear to dominate the rise in inter-regional inequality, which is the 
dominant pattern in the rise of inequality in China generally speaking. 
Figure 11 presents the complex pattern of changing inter-sectoral distribution of 
income in China.  Unlike Russia, China does not have a strong natural resource sector.  
Instead, the chief winners in the Chinese transition have been industrial sectors with 
monopoly power: transportation and utilities. As in Russia, the banking sector is a major 
winner, something that is visibly reflected in the construction of bank towers across the 
country.  Manufacturing in contrast emerges as a relative loser (this is true in most parts 
of the country, though not in the major exporting regions such as Guangdong 
province), while the position of farming and trade, which was never strong, has also 
deteriorated.  The positions of mining and construction, formerly quite high in the 
Chinese pecking order, have fallen considerably. 
Figure 11.  Intersectoral contributions to inequality in China, 1978-1999.  
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook and authors’ calculations. 
 
Figures 12 and 13 present the evolution of inequality across provinces in China 
in a pair of maps organized on principles similar to those shown earlier for Russia.  
Superficially, the pattern is quite similar: relative income gains are concentrated in 
relatively narrow areas of the country.  However, it should be noted that, in contrast to 
the Russian case, the great winners in China are heavily populated.  Guangdong 
province, in particular, holds well over eighty million people.   
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook and authors’ calculations. Maps generated by ArcView. 
 























Source: China Statistical Yearbook and authors’ calculations.  Maps generated by ArcView. Note that the city of Shanghai 
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Figures 14 and 15 present sector-province line graphs for China similar to those 
shown for Russia in Figures 6 and 7.   Notable details include the sharp fall in the 
relative position of construction, formerly the best-paid activity in China, and the 
decline in the relative position of manufacturing workers (Industry in the 1987 figure, 
manufacturing in that for 2000).  On the other hand, the position of science, health and 
education has held up much better in China than was the case in Russia.  The rising 
relative position of almost all activities in the few top provinces is clearly apparent in 
Figure 15. 




















Source: China Statistical Yearbook and authors’ calculations.  
 
Figure 15.  Sector and Province Inequality in China, 2000. 
 
Sector IN is broken up into MA, UT, and MI in 1994, and SS is added at that date. See appendix for definitions. 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook and authors’ calculations 
Inequality in China - 2000 by Sector and Province










Inequalites in China -- 1987 by Sector and Province










EJCE, vol. 1, n. 1 (2004) 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
104 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Despite the radical differences between the macroeconomic experiences of 
Russia and China in the transition, disconcerting similarities can be found.   In both 
countries sharp rises in inequality coincided with macroeconomic crises. This was true 
of the industrial collapse of 1991 and the financial implosion of 1998 in Russia, and of 
the growth slowdown of 1993-1994 in China, known euphemistically in China as the 
period of “soft landing.”   In both countries, incomes diverged more sharply on a 
regional than on a sectoral basis.  In both, relative income rose most sharply in the 
financial and political centers (Moscow, Beijing, and Shanghai) and in the regions 
providing hard currency export earnings (West Siberia, Guangdong).  In both, it seems 
likely that economic liberalization produced economic rents for those sectors enjoying 
monopoly power in the domestic market (transportation, energy, electricity and other 
utilities).  And in both countries, the rise of finance capitalism produced large relative 
and no doubt also absolute gains for those employed in the financial sectors. 
It is no surprise that rising inequality should be a characteristic feature of 
transition from a socialist to a capitalist system.  This is true whether the transition is or 
is not an economic success.  In the absence of strong agricultural support programs and 
social security systems -- such as exist in the United States and Europe -- a particular 
feature of redistribution is a sharp decline in the relative income of the countryside.  It 
seems that there is no mechanism that works effectively to offset this tendency in the 
transition to the market economy. 
Whether education, health care, and science suffer major losses of position 
under economic transition depends, on the other hand, on the tax system and public 
priorities of the government.  China has protected these sectors and has expanded them 
in line with the growth of the Chinese economy overall.  Indeed, a close analysis of 
changes in province-sector cells reveals that the education sectors in Shanghai and 
Beijing are among the most rapidly gainers of relative size and income in all of China 
during the late 1990s.  In Russia these sectors have suffered absolute and relative losses, 
with serious consequences for the health, education and culture of the population. 
It seems likely that the continuing presence of control over the capital account, 
and the corresponding suppression of capital flight from China, is a major factor in 
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Appendix 
Sector Codes in Russia and China 
Russia 
IP Industrial  Production 





TS  Trade and food services 
HO Housing 
HS  Health, sporting and social services 
ED Education 
CA  Culture and arts 
SC Science 
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FA  Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and Fishery 
MI Mining,  and  Quarrying 
MA Manufacturing 
UT  Electricity, Gas and Water Production and Supply 
CT Construction 
GE  Geological Prospecting and Water Conservancy 
TR  Transport, Storage, Post & Telecommunications 
WS  Wholesale and Retail Trade,& Catering Services 
BA  Banking and Insurance 
RE Real  Estate  Trade 
SS Social  Services 
HE  Health Care, Sporting & Social Welfare 
ED  Education, Culture and Art, Radio, Film and Television 
RD  Scientific Research and Polytechnical Services 





Note: Chinese industrial code IN becomes split into MI, MA, and UT in 1994; Sector SS is added at that date.   